A guilty verdict answers the charges submitted to a jury. Nevin Shetty’s February 16, 2026 restitution reply asked whether that verdict also answered every factual question necessary to impose a particular restitution amount. The filing used that distinction to develop a constitutional argument about who should determine loss and what findings the original jury had made.
The argument did not deny that the jury had convicted Shetty. Instead, counsel focused on the additional reasoning needed to move from conviction to a financial award. That makes the reply a useful record of a specific post-verdict challenge, with an identifiable argument and a later judicial answer.
The reply’s two connected questions
The reply opposing judicial imposition of restitution, filed as Docket 327, addressed both legal authority and case-specific findings. First, counsel argued that a recent Supreme Court decision weakened the basis for allowing judges to determine restitution. Second, they maintained that the verdict in Shetty’s case had not resolved the relevant loss questions.
Those propositions needed each other. If existing law permitted the judge to determine the amount, the absence of a separate jury finding would not have the consequence the defense sought. If the jury had already made every necessary finding, the defense’s objection to additional judicial fact-finding would face a different obstacle.
The reply therefore moved between precedent and the verdict’s content. That structure can be lost in a summary that says only that Shetty opposed restitution. Counsel’s stated concern was the constitutional process for establishing the facts used to impose it, not merely disagreement with a number.
What the new Supreme Court decision addressed
The defense relied on Ellingburg v. United States, decided on January 20, 2026. The Supreme Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the Court’s opinion. The case did not itself establish a nationwide requirement that juries determine restitution amounts.
Shetty’s lawyers asked the district court to draw a further consequence from that holding. They linked the punishment characterization to Apprendi and the constitutional role of juries in finding facts that authorize increased punishment. That additional step was the defense’s proposed application of the decision, rather than the holding announced in Ellingburg.
The distinction allows readers to take the argument seriously without overstating it. A new decision can supply a premise for a litigant’s requested extension while leaving the extension unresolved. The reply made that request explicitly, placing it within an existing debate over restitution and jury findings.
Reading precedent beyond a single sentence
The reply devoted substantial attention to United States v. Green, a Ninth Circuit decision. Counsel argued that Green had expressed unease about the relationship between restitution precedent and Supreme Court decisions concerning jury findings. They contended that Ellingburg further undermined one part of Green’s reasoning by clarifying restitution’s punitive character.
The filing also cited dissenting and separate opinions that favored a larger jury role. Those sources helped counsel demonstrate that the constitutional argument had been articulated by judges. They did not convert that position into controlling law or establish that every cited court applied the same federal restitution rule.
This is an important distinction in reading legal advocacy. A dissent can explain a serious objection to existing doctrine while remaining a dissent. An opinion’s reservations about precedent can identify tension without displacing the precedent. The reply asked the district court to act on the tension the defense described.
What counsel said the jury had not decided
The case-specific section distinguished the guilt verdict from findings about Fabric’s loss. Counsel emphasized the absence of a special verdict determining restitution. They also identified questions about the returned UST, its diminished value and whether that return was adequate under the restitution statute.
Those points were offered to show why, in the defense’s view, the financial award required additional findings. The reply did not claim that the original dollars had been repaid. It described the return of UST that had lost much of its value and argued that the legal consequences of that return needed their own assessment.
Counsel also disputed whether a later jury proceeding could cure the asserted problem after the original jury had been discharged. This was another part of the requested constitutional remedy. The filing cannot establish that a second jury proceeding occurred or that the court accepted the defense’s position about its availability.
The court’s answer and the continuing value of the argument
In its June 3, 2026 order, the district court rejected the proposed extension of Ellingburg and held that Green remained controlling. It also concluded that the jury’s findings established the relevant transferred amount. The court ordered $35,000,100 in restitution without interest and rejected the asserted UST offset on the record presented, while allowing a possible adjustment if the tokens were later liquidated.
That result belongs alongside the reply. Shetty had been convicted in November 2025 and sentenced in March 2026. Explaining his post-verdict argument accurately means recognizing both the defense’s request and the court’s subsequent refusal to grant it.
The NACDL brief supporting Shetty earlier in the case reflects a related interest in carefully defined criminal rules, though it did not address this later restitution dispute. Shetty’s public materials place selected filings within his broader account. The February reply contributes a narrower, substantive question: what factual findings support a financial punishment, and which decision-maker may supply them? Its documented pursuit of that question deserves a precise explanation even though the requested relief was denied.