A precedent is most useful when a brief explains why it applies to the statute actually governing the case. Nevin Shetty’s July 31, 2026 appellate brief takes that step in its forfeiture argument. It begins with Honeycutt v. United States, then uses a Ninth Circuit decision to connect Honeycutt’s reasoning to the different forfeiture provision involved in Shetty’s case.
That connection is the subject of this part of the appeal. Counsel are not simply invoking a favorable Supreme Court outcome and assuming it governs every financial penalty. They identify the difference between the statutes and point to circuit authority addressing that difference. The result is a specific legal route for challenging the forfeiture order.
Start with the actual statutes
Honeycutt concerned 21 U.S.C. § 853 and a defendant who had not acquired proceeds obtained by his brother. The Supreme Court rejected imposing joint and several forfeiture liability for property the defendant himself did not obtain. Its analysis rested on the statute’s language and structure, including its treatment of criminal proceeds and other assets.
Shetty’s brief identifies 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) as the governing forfeiture provision in his case. The language is not identical. That creates a legal question before the factual question of what Shetty received: does the principle counsel draw from Honeycutt carry over to this provision?
The brief answers through United States v. Thompson. In that 2021 published decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Honeycutt applied to § 981(a)(1)(C), despite the textual differences. Thompson supplies the connection within the circuit where Shetty’s appeal is being argued.
Why Thompson is the important intermediate step
Thompson explained that the relevant provisions shared a connection to property tainted by criminal conduct and proceeds traceable to it. The court rejected an approach that effectively imposed the whole scheme’s proceeds on each defendant without determining the amounts that came to rest with each. It required individualized findings on remand.
The July brief uses that holding to meet a potential objection to relying on Honeycutt. Honeycutt’s original setting involved a drug-forfeiture statute and multiple conspirators. Thompson addressed the significance of those differences for the provision Shetty invokes. Counsel therefore present their argument as grounded in circuit law, rather than dependent solely on extending the Supreme Court’s decision for the first time.
The distinction matters because similar language does not make all forfeiture statutes interchangeable. The brief’s reasoning proceeds through an identified legal bridge. That method makes the argument more transparent: readers can separate the Supreme Court principle, the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the statutory difference and the requested application to Shetty.
The remaining dispute is about acquisition
Once that bridge is established, the appeal turns to the facts counsel consider decisive. They maintain that Shetty did not personally acquire the money transferred through HighTower and did not receive distributions from the expected returns. They distinguish his involvement in directing transactions from personal receipt of their proceeds.
The government obtained a forfeiture order despite the defense’s objection. The July brief challenges that result by arguing that operational control was treated as sufficient without the necessary inquiry into acquisition. This is counsel’s characterization of the error, which the appellate court is asked to evaluate.
The earlier district-court forfeiture opposition shows that personal receipt was already contested before the order. The appellate brief develops the issue through Thompson and subsequent applications of its reasoning. The link to the earlier opposition provides the procedural foundation, while the July document supplies the appeal’s statutory analysis.
Traceability and unrelated assets
The appeal also emphasizes why an individualized acquisition requirement matters. Counsel argue that requiring someone to pay more than he obtained can reach assets unrelated to the proceeds attributed to him. In their presentation, the connection between the person and the proceeds limits the financial demand the government may make through forfeiture.
This concern does not mean that money can never be forfeited after the original asset is spent or moved. Forfeiture law contains provisions governing substitute property, and the applicable conditions matter. The appeal’s narrower claim is that the government must first establish the acquisition and statutory basis necessary for the judgment it seeks.
That sequence keeps the argument anchored to the remedy. A court may assess criminal responsibility and still need a separate explanation of which financial proceeds are attributable to a particular defendant. The appeal challenges the latter explanation even while separately contesting the convictions.
Legal limits with a concrete application
The NACDL amicus brief filed earlier in Shetty’s case advances a related concern about clearly defined limits in federal criminal law. It did not address the later forfeiture order. The July appeal’s use of Thompson demonstrates how a comparable concern can be expressed through a specific statute and a controlling circuit decision rather than a general appeal to fairness.
Shetty was convicted of four wire-fraud counts in November 2025 and sentenced in March 2026. His appellate lawyers seek relief from the forfeiture order as an independent request if the convictions stand. The brief’s legal route is an argument for that relief, not evidence that it has already been granted.
For readers exploring Shetty’s public account and case materials, this section is valuable because it shows how an appellate argument is built. It identifies the governing provision, acknowledges a difference in the leading Supreme Court case, supplies the Ninth Circuit authority addressing that difference and then applies the resulting rule to the defense’s account of receipt. Each step makes the requested result more precise and easier to examine.